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BOOK REVIEW
THE CULTURAL IMPLICATIONS OF
JUDICIAL SELECTION
Yxta Maya Murray
RACE-INGJUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLAR-
ENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALY. Toni Morri-
son, ed.t New York: Pantheon Books. 1992. 475 pp. $15.00.
The Constitution allows the President to "nominate . .. by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate... Judges of the supreme
Court."' Traditionally, the same types of faces have dominated this
political ritual: White men choose other White men to inhabit the
corridors of power. As women and minorities have gradually gained
political access and representation, however, the President's nomina-
tion and the Senate's confirmation hearings have increasingly become
starting dramas in which the collisions between race, gender and
power are played out.
The 1991 nomination and confirmation of Justice Clarence
Thomas will go down in history as the first confirmation in which
these tensions became evident. The Thomas appointment process ig-
nited a strident debate, within the African American community and
the nation as a whole, over the proper definition of "fitness," or a
nominee's capacity to serve in a top government position. The issues
raised during Thomas' judicial selection process focused on crucial
but previously little-asked questions about race and gender. The ensu-
ing national discussion surpassed previous battles over Supreme Court
nominations by demonstrating that the confirmation process is
neither race-free nor neutral. And how could it be otherwise? Presi-
dent Bush had vaulted Thomas, a seeming cultural anomaly, a Black
"neo-conservative," into the national political spotlight by nominating
him for the highest judicial position in the land. The arrival of law
t Clerk to Judge Ferdinand Fernandez, Ninth Circuit, 1994-95; Clerk to Judge Harry
L. Hupp, Central District of California, 1993-94; J.D. 1993, Stanford Law School.
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professor Anita Hill and her accusations of sexual harassment further
complicated matters. Her presence in the hearings made the ques-
tion of Thomas' fitness even more complex by provoking discussion
about the role of Black women in the larger African American com-
munity and the struggles they face at the crossroads of race and gen-
der. Her testimony, and the SenateJudiciary Committee's dismissal of
it, powerfully illustrated that the Senators' purportedly neutral inquir-
ies into fitness were not neutral at all, but were instead shaded with
biases and preconceptions.
Along with this political change has come a shift in scholarship.
Race-ingJustice, En-gendering Power, Essays on Anita Hill, Clarence Thomas,
and the Construction of Social Reality2 is an unprecedented collection of
nineteen essays by scholars from different disciplines, edited and with
an introduction by novelist Toni Morrison. The book's value lies in
the essayists' attention to the potential race and gender meaning of
the judicial selection process: it delineates the seemingly intractable
cultural issues which accompany presidential nominations and Senate
confirmations of women and people of color. Race-ing Justice, En-
genderingPower presents a complement and a partial rejoinder to dom-
inant theories about the appointment process which have been set
forth by such scholars as Lawrence Tribe,3 Bruce Ackerman, 4 Stephen
Carter,5 Robert Bork6 and Henry Paul Monaghan.7 It recasts their
debate over judicial selection to include race and gender conscious-
ness, and thus provides us with a broadened perspective which can
help us think about ways to remedy the process.
I
DOMINANT THEORIES OF THE APPOINTMENT PROCESS AND
"OUTSIDER" JURISPRUDENCE
The failed nominations of Robert Bork and Douglas Ginsburg
prompted some of the most prominent members of the legal academy
to tackle the judicial selection process. The main point of contention
was its "politicization," that is, whether the Senate should examine a
candidate's political ideology when considering her fitness for a posi-
tion on the Supreme Court. Some academics, such as Tribe and
Monaghan, regard Senate consideration of a nominee's political ide-
2 RACE-RINGJus;TcE, EN-GENDERING Powvm ESSAYS ON ANInA HiLL, CLARENCE THOMAS,
AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SoCIAL REA=IT (Toni Morrison ed., 1992) [hereinafter RACE-
ING JuSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER].
3 LAWRENCE TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT (1985).
4 Bruce A. Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1164 (1988).
5 Stephen Carter, The Confirmation Mess, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1185 (1988).
6 ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990).
7 Henry Paul Monaghan, The Confirmation Process: Law or Politics?, 101 HARv. L. REV.
1202 (1988).
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ology as either necessary8 or appropriate. 9 Other scholars, including
Carter and Bork, argue that ideological considerations result in less
qualified judges' ° and may violate the separation of powers scheme set
forth in the Constitution." Ackerman mourns the development of
"transformative appointments," where battles over particularly bril-
liant and ideological nominees, such as Robert Bork, really represent
battles over changes in constitutional law.' 2 Accordingly, the appoint-
ment of such nominees can accomplish constitutional transformation
outside of the Article V amendment process.'8 Ackerman strongly
8 See TRIBE, supra note 3, at 93. Tribe contends that:
[w]hether a nominee is fit to serve as a Supreme CourtJustice is a question
that can be responsibly answered only after a thorough examination of the
nominee's basic outlook and ideas about the law, as well as a critical assess-
ment of the nominee's character and intellect.
... Each Senator, as well as the President, should determine the outer
boundaries of what is acceptable in terms of a potential Justice's constitu-
tional and judicial philosophies-a candidate's substantive view of what the
law should be, a candidate's institutional views of what role the Supreme
Court should play.
Id.
9 See Monaghan, supra note 7, at 1206. Monaghan observes that:
both the President and the Senate share a common responsibility for the
appointment of morally and professionally fit persons to the Court. The
Senate has the duty to reject any nominee whose appointment it believes
will not advance the public good as the Senate understands it .... [N]o
affirmative constitutional compulsion to confirm exists.
Id.
10 See BoRic, supra note 6, at 347. Bork notes that:
[a] president who wants to avoid a battle like mine, and most presidents
would prefer to, is likely to nominate men and women who have not written
much, and certainly nothing that could be regarded as controversial by left-
leaning senators and groups.... In the longer run, the anticipation that
campaigns such as this may be waged is likely to affect both the course of
the law and the intellectual life of the law .... It is quite conceivable that
some lower court judges may be affected in the decisions they make and in
the opinions they write.
Id.
11 See Carter, supra note 5, at 1194. Stephen Carter believes that the Senate's ideologi-
cal investigation of a nominee can harm the separation of powers by making the nominee
too accountable to the Senate in her future decisionmaking:
Judicial independence, if the concept is to have any force, is not a cloak
that can be thrown around a newJustice at the very last minute-after the
administration of the oath. Independence must arrive earlier, and cover all
potential nominees, from the moment a sitting Justice retires or dies. A
nominee is not independent when she is quizzed, openly or not, on the
degree of her reverence for particular precedents.
Id.
Carter does not explain exactly how "quizzing" will render the nominee dependent
upon the Senate. Presumably, judicial independence breaks down when the nominee,
who desperately wants the position for which she has been nominated, tells the Senate that
she will decide future opinions in ways that please the Senate. This genuflecting to the
Senate's "political" desires impairs the nominee's ability to decide future cases without that
influence.
12 See Ackerman, supra note 4, at 1171-73.
13 U.S. CONST. art. V.
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criticizes this development because it "lacks institutional weight and
legal focus... [and] also threatens to be unacceptably elitist."14
Although valuable in their insights and ability to spark contro-
versy over appropriate methods of determining fitness, these scholars
fail to explain fully the debate over Clarence Thomas. Their theories
of the appointment process are too narrow because they examine only
the propriety of the Senate's ideological investigations, and that nar-
rowness precludes the theories from accommodating the cacopho-
nous clash of race and gender issues which may accompany the
nominations of women and people of color. The Thomas appoint-
ment illustrates the gaps in their work, for when we place Thomas on
their theoretical matrix we see a contrast: something more was at
stake in the Thomas hearings than merely a debate over whether the
Senate should have investigated Thomas' views on abortion, the First
Amendment and natural law. Instead, the Thomas appointment pro-
cess raised many difficult questions beyond the propriety of Senate
consideration of ideology: the substance and structure of the process
also demonstrated the pervasive racial and sexual biases existing in
our society.
To make sense of appointments like Thomas', we need to enrich
the dominant theories about judicial selection by infusing them with
race and gender consciousness. The tools for doing so have been de-
veloped by critical race theorists and feminist theorists. Critical race
theory and its intersection with feminist theory, which has also been
characterized as an "outsider's"jurisprudence,' 5 dedicates itself to dis-
mantling the illusion of race and gender neutrality in the law and to
recognizing race and gender bias where they exist. According to Pro-
fessor Mari Matsuda, it is a 'Jurisprudence recognizing, struggling
within, and utilizing contradiction, dualism and ambiguity" which "at-
tack[s] the effects of racism and patriarchy in order to attack th[eir]
deep, hidden, tangled roots .... Outsiders . .. def[y] the habit of
neutral principles to entrench existing power."' 6 Race-ingJustice, En-
gendering Power is the first attempt to apply this focus to judicial
selection.
II
RACE-rNG JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER AND THE CLARENCE
THOMAS HEARINGS
The collection of essays may be seen as a response to, in Morri-
son's words, the "emptiness, the unforthcoming truths that lay at the
14 Id. at 1182.
15 Mar J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Wictim's Stoy, 87
MICH. L. REv. 2320, 2323 (1989).
16 Id. at 2324-25.
19941 377
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center of the state's performance"' 7 in the Thomas appointment
which "contributed much to the frenzy as people grappled for mean-
ing, for substance unavailable through ordinary channels."' 8 From
the "confusion, the murk, the sense of helpless rage that accompanied
the confirmation process,"' 9 these scholars and writers attempt to
make sense of "what happened, how it happened, why it happened;
what implications may be drawn, what consequences may follow."2 0
Although the African American community divided over Thomas'
placement on the highest court, Morrison argues that its members
were nonetheless able to engage in a valuable discussion over the ap-
pointment: "[R]egardless of political alliances, something positive and
liberating has already surfaced. In matters of race and gender, it is
now possible and necessary, as it seemed never to have been before, to
speak about these matters without the barriers, the silences, the em-
barrassing gaps in discourse."2'
Race-ing Justice, En-gendering Power continues this conversation.
The texts reveal an almost overwhelming sense of rage and concern,
but these strong emotions do not muddy the arguments. On the con-
trary, the essays are clarified by their authors' anger. The authors cre-
atively use letters, narratives and other devices to analyze the Thomas
appointment, and they offer many competing theses. Despite their
differences, each writer shares in a common goal: to understand this
episode ofjudicial selection in terms of its race and gender meaning.
With an eye toward race and gender consciousness, the essays chal-
lenge the "neutrality" of Clarence Thomas' appointment process.
They also re-examine the definitions of fitness and the proper meth-
ods of determining whether a nominee conforms to a particular no-
tion of judicial fitness. Moreover, they examine how the process
implicates African American identity and re-creates the patterns of
dominance and oppression which characterize the history of people
of color.
A. Challenging Neutrality
One of the authors' targets is the seeming neutrality of the judi-
cial selection process. This image of neutrality was fostered from the
beginning by President Bush's assertion that he had not chosen
Thomas because of his race, but because he was the best qualified
17 Toni Morrison, Introduction to RACE-ING JusTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER, supra note
2, at vii, ix.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id. at x.
21 Id. at xxx.
[Vol. 79:374
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individual for the position.22 The essayists assail Bush's claim, arguing
that racial politics motivated the nomination.
In An Open Letter to Justice Clarence Thomas from a Federal Judicial
Colleague,23 Judge A. Leon Higginbotham writes that "President
Bush[] assess[ed] thatyou were 'the best person for the position.' But,
candidly, Justice Thomas, I do not believe that you were indeed the
most competent person to be on the Supreme Court. Charles Bowser,
a distinguished African-American Philadelphia lawyer, said, 'I'd be
willing to bet ... that not one of the senators who voted to confirm
him would hire him as their lawyer.' . . . Rather, they were acting
solely as politicians."24
Other essayists also criticize the purported neutrality of the
choice. In her essay Doing Things With Words: "Racism" as Speech Act
and the Undoing ofJustice,2 5 Claudia Brodsky Lacour concludes that the
motivation prompting Thomas' nomination was far from race-neutral.
Instead, she finds that Bush's choice of Thomas was grounded on ra-
cism: "[The Senators'] process of questioning Clarence Thomas...
[was] shaped ... by... 'racism.' It was, of course, precisely this ...
[racism] that enabled George Bush to nominate Thomas in the first
place, and, in so doing, to call him, 'the best-qualified man for the
job.' "26 In her essay, The Supreme Court Appointment Process and the Poli-
tics of Race and Sex,2 7 Professor Margaret Burnham also finds racial sig-
nificance in the process, arguing that Bush nominated Thomas to
immobilize African American dissent against an extremely conserva-
tive addition to the Court. She calls the nomination an act of
"throw[ing] to the black community a crumb it could neither digest
nor spit out," a "gamble for the Republicans .. .that paid off roy-
ally."28 Similarly, Professor Kendall Thomas writes that Clarence
22 See Benjamin C. Bradlee, America's Truthache: Access, Manipulation and the Large and
Small Lies of America's Presidents, TiE WASH. POST, Nov. 17,1991, at Cl, C4 (quoting Bush as
saying that "[t]he fact that [Thomas] is black and a minority has nothing to do with this
sense that he is the best qualified at this time.").
23 See A. Leon Higginbottom,Jr., An Open Letter to Justice Clarence Thomas From a Federal
Judicial Colleague, in RAcF-rNG JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER, supra note 2, at 3.
24 Id. at 19-20.
25 Claudia Brodskly Lacour, Doing Things With Words: "Racism" as Speech Act and the
Undoing ofJustice, in RACE-INGJUSTICE, EN-GENDEING POWER, supra note 2, at 127.
26 I.
27 Margaret A. Burnham, The Supreme Court Appointment Process and the Politics of Race
and Sex, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER, supra note 2, at 290.
28 Id. at 291. In full, Burnham argues that:
[Bush] had solidified the Rehnquist-Scalia block on the court; had thrown
to the black community a crumb it could neither digest nor spit out; had
given wedge politics, which he hopes will keep him in the White House four
more years, a dry run; had thrown into national prominence a small but
vocal band of black conservatives; and painted the Democrats as a bunch of
inept, braying jackasses who could not bring order to their own House,
much less a nation. From the beginning, Thomas was a gamble for the
1994] 379
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Thomas' nomination was enveloped in race-meaning "[f]rom the mo-
ment his nomination was announced, [when] the politicians and the
popular press went out of their way to present an image of a man who
was unique and at the same time exemplary . .. a 'Black Horatio
Alger.' "29
The essayists' recognition of Bush's purported neutrality as dis-
guised race consciousness resembles critical race theorists' analyses of
how "color blindness"30 in the law only disguises race consciousness
and may perpetuate racial subordination. Similarly, these authors ar-
gue that Bush's and the Senate's purported color blindness only
masked a political, and "cynic [al]" 31 use of race. Their essays chal-
lenge Bush's race-neutral story of Thomas' rise with competing stories
about Bush's political and race-conscious choice of Thomas and about
the way certain Senators specifically tied Thomas' merit to his race. In
so doing, the essayists demonstrate what Professor Richard Delgado
calls one of critical race theory's primary objectives: to develop "a war
between stories... [which] contend for, tug at, our minds."3 2
This practice helps enrich our understanding ofjudicial selection
beyond the race-neutral analysis given to us by the dominant theorists.
Professor Ackerman, for example, analyzes judicial selection in terms
of its potential to change the course of constitutional jurisprudence.
He cites President Roosevelt's successful nominations of Justices
Black, Reed, Frankfurter, Douglas, and Murphy, who were constitu-
tionally "transformative" in their embrace of the New Deal, and con-
trasts them with Reagan's failed nomination of Judge Bork, who, if
Republicans, for they knew that it would be more difficult to get him
through the Senate than had been the case with either of the two previous
nominees, Justices Anthony Kennedy and David Souter. But it was a gam-
ble that paid off royally. As one GOP strategist crowed after the final Sen-
ate vote, "We won our nominee. We hurt the Democrats. Everything
beyond that is pure political gravy."
Id.
29 Kendall Thomas, Strange Fruit, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POwER, supra
note 2, at 364, 379.
30 Professor Neil Gotanda writes that the judiciary's vision of the Constitution as a
color blind document does not result in racial equality, but rather permits it "to describe,
to accommodate, and then to ignore issues of subordination.... Color-blind[ness] ... is
important because it suggests a seemingly neutral and objective method of decisionmaking
that avoids any consideration of race." Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-
Blind, 44 STAN. L. REv. 1, 17 (1991).
31 Ronald Dworkin, One YearLater, The Debate Goes On, N.Y. TIMEs BOOK REV., Oct. 25,
1992, at 1, 33. Dworkin notes that:
President Bush['s] ... cynicism has never been more evident than when he
claimed that race played no part in his choice ofJudge Thomas to replace
Justice Thurgood Marshall, and that Judge Thomas, who had never prac-
ticed law or produced any legal scholarship at all, was simply "the best man
for the job."
32 Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative 87
MICH. L. REv. 2411, 2418 (1989).
[Vol. 79:374
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confirmed, would have been similarly transformative.33 This race-less
and gender-less framework fails to explain the race and gender issues
accompanying the Thomas nomination. The Thomas nomination is
not important simply because he does or does not fit on a continuum
of "transformability." The essayists in Race-ing Justice, En-gendering
Power reveal the Thomas nomination as, instead, "deformative"3 4 be-
cause Bush chose Thomas based on his race; because Bush's assertion
of race-neutrality was lypocritical and used to stymie political opposi-
tion, and because, despite the veneer of race neutrality, Thomas'
merit and worth were packaged and inextricably tied to his race and
to his climb up the rungs of class associated with that race.35
B. The Question of "Fitness"
The essayists in Race-ing Justice, En-gendering Power continue to
challenge the neutrality of the Thomas proceedings and ferret out
their race-meaning by dismantling the question of fitness in judicial
selection and examining the cultural assumptions that it assigns. "Fit-
ness" is an expansive term that can encompass various factors: it is the
catch-all phrase which designates whether a nominee is qualified to
serve as ajustice. So viewed, fitness is an accumulation of competence
or merit, ideology and moral character. The essayists in Race-ingJus-
tice, En-gendering Power analyze how Thomas "measured up," and how
race and gender politics insinuated themselves into the final determi-
nation of fitness.
33 Ackerman, supra note 4, at 1174-75.
34 See Thomas, supra note 29, at 382. This is Professor Kendall Thomas' term. He
argues that
In symbolic terms the Thomas nomination was a wholesale rejection of the
moral legacy of the Civil Rights Movement, and the memory of the suffer-
ing and struggle that the story of that movement has come to represent in
American political culture. For this reason I believe that the Thomas con-
firmation hearings were not "transformative" at all. To the contrary. I
would submit that the appointment of Clarence Thomas to the Supreme
Court is more correctly characterized as a "deformative" moment in the
history of American constitutional politics.
Id.
35 Id. at 381-82. Professor Thomas notes this gap in theory.
Although the terms of Ackerman's analysis take us some way toward an un-
derstanding of the meaning of the Thomas appointment, they do not go far
enough. A successful account of the Thomas nomination must come to
grips with the specificity and significance of race as an independent factor
in the politics of Supreme Court appointments.
1994]
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1. Competence or Merit
Clarence Thomas graduated from the Yale Law School in the
middle of his class,36 was chairman of the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission,37 and had spent one year on the District of Co-
lumbia's Court of Appeals38 before being elevated to the Supreme
Court. Thomas may be seen as a weak choice because of his youth,3 9
his performance at the E.E.O.C.40 and his legal scholarship. 4' It may
be unfair to dismiss Thomas immediately as unfit for the position of
justice because of the conclusions of "competence" that we can derive
from his resume. Not all supreme courtjustices have served on ajudi-
cial bench,42 and others have been firmly criticized for lack of compe-
tence although they later rose in our esteem.43 Nevertheless, the
essayists in Race-ing Justice, En-gendering Power who discuss Clarence
36 See Fred Barnes, Weirdo Alert: White House Watch-the campaign to sell Clarence Thomas
to the Senate; THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 5, 1991, at 7.
37 See R.W. Apple, Jr., Senate Confirms Thomas, 52-48, Ending Week of Bitter Battle: 'Time
for Healing, Judge Says, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1991, at Al, A19.
38 The White House FEn. NEws SERVICE, Oct. 16, 1991, available in LEXIS, Legis Library,
FEDNEWS File.
39 Clarence Thomas was 43 years old at the time of his confirmation. See Justice
Thomas: On What Basis?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1991, § 4, at 16A.
40 See Congressional Black Caucus Foundation, In Opposition to Clarence Thomas: Where
We Must Stand and Why, in COURT OF APPEAL 231 (1992). The author observes that:
While Chairman of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Thomas consistently advocated narrow interpretations of civil rights prece-
dents, including repeated refusals to seek the full range of remedies against discrimi-
nation provided by statute and by case law. Thomas was so reluctant to
bring class and systemic cases that Congress had to earmark EEOC funds
specifically for that type of enforcement and threaten to cut the budget of
the chair and members of the EEOC. Because of his mismanagement and
indifference, more than 13,000 age discrimination claims missed the statutory
deadline for action and had to be revived by special statute.
Id. at 234.
41 See Barbara Allen Babcock et al., Judge Clarence Thomas' Vriews on the Fundamental
Right to Privacy: A Report to the United States Senate Judiciary Committee; in COURT OF APPEAL
255 (1992). Babcock argues that:
At the core of Thomas' claims to constitutional authority and a dominant
theme throughout his writings and speeches is a belief that the Constitu-
tion should be interpreted in light of "natural law" or "higher law." . . .
"Natural law" is a slippery concept. It has been invoked in noble causes
.... But it has also been used in invidious ways.... Despite the central
role natural law plays in his professional writings, Judge Thomas has said
surprisingly little about the specific content of his natural law philosophy.
His discussions of natural law, though numerous, tend to be abstract and
repetitive, often confusing, and sometimes contradictory.
Id. at 259.
42 Consider, for example, Felix Frankfurter, who, although active in government, had
never been ajudge, and had devoted his life to constitutional scholarship before his eleva-
tion to the Court. See HENRYJ. ABRAHAM, JusTICES AND PRESIDENTS 220-22 (3d ed. 1992).
43 Hugo Black initially appeared to be a terrible choice for the position. Id. at 214-16
("The intellectual and soft-spoken liberal was portrayed as being utterly unqualified by
training, temperament, and constitutional dedication.").
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Thomas' professional capacities agree that he is not qualified to serve
on the Court, and indeed, some find that his work is the product of a
"mediocre mind."44 It is nothing new that they should conclude that
Thomas' credentials do not justify his placement on the court; nomi-
nees for that position have been challenged on those grounds
before.45 What is compelling is how they detail the way that race in-
formed the question of whether Thomas was competent to be a
Justice.
The essayists note that the concept of Thomas' fitness was not
linked so much to his professional and intellectual accomplishments
as to his rise to power despite his race and class. Margaret Burnham
writes that "[e]arly in the process the whole country ... became in-
vested in Thomas' success and transformed into a cheering squad for
their 'local black boy made good.' ",46 Professor Kendall Thomas illus-
trates this measure of Thomas' merit when he quotes Senator Dan-
forth, who framed Thomas' competence to be a Supreme Court
Justice in terms of his race and class difference: "Nobody here was
born black in the segregated South... Nobody here was raised in a
shack for 7 years without plumbing, in a broken home. Nobody
knows that. Nobody has experienced that. Clarence Thomas has."47
Congress did not measure Thomas' intellectual competence to
serve on the Court solely by his credentials; Thomas was not touted
for his scholarship his performance in government, or his service on
the bench. Instead, Congress filtered the question of Thomas' com-
petence through the question of race, and his praise was meted out
with explicit reference to his race. Whether this is troubling or not
can be debated: after all, the individual who rises through the ranks
of power while weighed down by prejudice may deserve special recog-
nition. Thomas was, however, being judged in a purportedly race
neutral process. Two things-the close connection between his per-
ceived merit and stories about poverty and bigotry48 together with his
44 See Manning Marable, Clarence Thomas and the Crisis of Black Culture, in RACE-ING
JusTicE, EN-GENDERING POWER, supra note 2, at 61, 64 ("At best, Thomas's published writ-
ings revealed the working of a mediocre mind.").
45 See ABRAHAM, supra note 42, at 214 (discussing Justice Black).
46 See Burnham, supra note 27, at 300.
47 See Thomas, supra note 29, at 380. See also Remarks by SenatorJoseph Lieberman (D-Ct)
During Floor Debate Regarding Nomination of Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court: U.S. Senate,
FED. NEws SERVICE, Oct. 4, 1991, available in LEXIS, Legis Library, FEDNEWS File [herein-
after Remarks by SenatorJoseph Lieberman] ("IndeedJudge Thomas' entire life is an inspiring
example of what an individual who has faith, ability, and a desire to work can achieve in
this country, even in the face of the worst kinds of prejudice and adversity.").
48 Cornel West, Black Leadership and the Pitfalls of Racial Reasoning, in RACE-iNGJUsTicE,
EN-GENDERING POWER, supra note 2, at 390. West discusses these stories, mentioning "his
birth in Jim Crow Georgia, his childhood spent as the grandson of a black sharecropper,
his undeniably black phenotype degraded by racist ideals of beauty, and his gallant black
struggle for achievement in racist America." Id. at 391-92.
19941
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weak credentials-may convey a troubling message about what it
means to be the "best" qualified man of color for the position: that
even the "best black"49 will still be found lacking.
The dominant scholars on judicial selection do not make room
for these conceptions in the determination of intellectual competence
or merit. Stephen Carter writes that "it is perfectly sensible for the
Senate to review a candidate's professional experience to determine
whether she meets some baseline standard of legal and intellectual
competence." 50 "Legal and intellectual competence," or what also
might be called "merit," in judicial selection appears to be a race-free
concept, and Carter's work treats it that way. In the Thomas hearings,
however, the determination of competence was not neutral.
What did it mean that Thomas' merit was so expressly linked to
his race and class even while politicians claimed that they were scruti-
nizing him in a neutral process? The essayists' re-interpretations of
"merit" in judicial selection attempt to expose what some critical race
theorists call the "deep-rooted assumption of cultural universality and
neutrality [which] have removed from critical view the ways that Amer-
ican institutions reflect dominant racial and ethnic characteristics." 51
Thomas' nomination introduced him into a process where he was a
virtual novelty: only one African American, Thurgood Marshall, had
ever entered it before. That determinations of Thomas' competence
were not made without reference to his race reveals that the concept
of competence is steeped in what Kimberl6 Crenshaw calls the "white
norm."52 The merits of other nominees for the Court have not been
so measured, but because Thomas did not fit into the "mythical
norm,"53 the Senate calibrated his merit differently, in a way that high-
lighted his race for all to see.
49 STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AmaRMATrvE ACTION BABY 49 (1991) (refer-
ring to disparate assessment afforded Black achievement). See also West, supra note 48, at
391 (finding that the choice of Thomas exemplified "white-racist stereotypes about black
intellect.").
50 Carter, supra note 5, at 1186.
51 Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DuxE LJ. 758, 762.
52 Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Le-
gitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1331, 1379 (1988). Crenshaw dis-
cusses the fatuous but dangerous myth of neutrality that is masked as a white norm: "The
white norm... has not disappeared; it has only been submerged in popular consciousness.,
It continues in an unspoken form as a statement of the positive social norm, legitimating
the continuing domination of those who do not meet it." Id.
53 AUDRE LORDE, Age, Race, Class, and Sex: Women Redefining Difference, in SISTER OUT-
SIDER 114, 116 (1984):
Somewhere, on the edge of consciousness, there is what I call a mythical
normn, which each one of us within our hearts knows 'that is not me.' In
america, this norm is usually defined as white, thin, male, young, heterosex-
ual, christian, and financially secure. It is within this mythical norm that
the trappings of power reside within this society.
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2. Ideology
Fitness to be a Supreme CourtJustice increasingly involves an in-
vestigation of a nominee's ideology. That inquiry includes an exami-
nation of the nominee's views on issues (such as criminal justice,
abortion and free speech) and her approach to the construction of
statutory and constitutional language (such as Justice Scalia's strict
constructionism or Chief Justice Warren's method of broadly inter-
preting constitutional language).54
Clarence Thomas' ideology was one of the most hotly contested
issues in his nomination. Aligned with a Black neo-conservative move-
ment, Thomas has argued against affirmative action,55 does not be-
lieve in abortion,56 and allegedly has made some highly controversial
and derogatory comments regarding past civil rights leaders.57
Thomas' backers, having learned from Bork's spectacular failure, en-
couraged him to emphasize some aspects of his judicial philosophy
but to de-emphasize his views on abortion and affirmative action.58
The essayists in Race-ingJustice, En-gendering Power disagree on the
significance of Thomas' views. In Clarence Thomas and the Crisis of Black
Political Culture Manning Marable argues that Thomas' conservative
ideology renders him unfit to sit on the Court because it makes him
unable to represent African Americans in that position.59 According
to Marable, Thomas' pronounced conservatism and his departure
from the liberal views and goals of most African Americans have a
direct relationship to his ethnicity. Marable argues that Thomas' poli-
tics prevent him from being an authentic ethnically Black person:
54 See Paul A. Freund, Appointment ofJustices: Some Historical Perspectives, 101 HAzv. L.
REv. 1146 (1988) ("Though focus on the nominee's character remains paramount, the
other dominant factors have shifted from sectional and party affiliations to social and judi-
cial philosophy.").
55 See Clarence Thomas, Civil Rights as a Principle Versus Civil Rights as an Interest in
AssESSING THE REAGAN YEARs 391, 395 (David Boaz ed., 1988) (criticizing United Steel
Workers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979)).
56 See Congressional Black Caucus, supra note 40.
57 Id. at 241. (Thomas allegedly complained that civil rights leaders had done "noth-
ing right" and that all they ever do is "bitch, bitch, bitch, moan and whine.").
58 SenatorJoseph Lieberman stated that:
I must say that I found Judge Thomas' testimony... unsatisfying... be-
cause he appeared almost casually willing at times to express opinions on
some very current and complex issues of constitutional law ... and reluc-
tant to express any thoughts on others.... I have concluded that the con-
firmation process, particularly as it has evolved since the Bork nomination,
evoked that result.
Remarks by Senator Joseph Lieberman, supra note 47. See also Donald U. Devine, Reform the
Judicial Nomination Process Now: Five Proposals for a Return to Senatorial Comity, in THE Hu-
TAGE LEcruRs, Nov. 12, 1991, available in LEXIS, Legis Library, HFRPTS File ("Thomas
was schooled by a team of Washington insider lobbyists to 'learn' from the Kennedy and
Souter successes to be evasive in his answers to questions.").
59 See Marable, supra note 44, at 82.
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"[Thomas works] to promote [his] own career[ ] .... Racially, Thomas
remains 'black': both by governmental definition and societal recog-
nition .... Yet ethnically Thomas has ceased to be an African
American, in the context of political culture, social values and ideals,
and commitment to collective interests."60
Other essayists, however, find Thomas' approach to be a symbol
of strength in the Black community. Carol M. Swain, in her essay
Double Standard, Double Bind. African American Leadership After the
Thomas Debacle,61 writes that "[d]uring the confirmation process, it be-
came dramatically evident that there is no one person, nor, indeed,
one single voice to speak on behalf of African Americans .... The
diversity of black opinion .. .can be viewed as a sign of maturity
within the African-American community."62 Similarly, Toni Morrison
saw the political division over Thomas' judicial philosophy as evidence
that "black people think differently from one another; it is also clear
that the time for undiscriminating racial unity has passed. A conversa-
tion, a serious exchange between black men and women, has begun in
a new arena, and the contestants defy the mold."63 Morrison and
Swain agree that the emergence of different ideologies is a positive
development because it allows for diversity within the African Ameri-
can community and also acknowledges a strain of Black conservatism.
Swain notes that "African Americans are not nearly as single-mindedly
liberal as they are often portrayed to be. On non-economic issues, in
fact, a clear strand of conservatism is evident. '64
The analysis of ideology in Race-ingJustice, En-gendering Power de-
parts from traditional theories about the role of ideology in judicial
selection. Under dominant theories ofjudicial selection, "ideology" is
a race-free concept,65 and the debate focuses on the propriety of con-
60 Id. at 81-82.
61 Carol M. Swain, Double Standard, Double Bind: African-American Leaderhip After the
Thomas Debacle, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER, supra note 2, at 215, 215.
62 Id.
63 Morrison, supra note 17, at xxx.
64 Swain, supra note 61, at 222.
65 Lawrence Tribe finds that a nominee's "judicial philosophy" is best examined by
asking "potential Justices about the substantive directions they believe the Supreme Court
should take, and why-and how they would have it proceed along those paths...." TRiBE,
supra note 3, at 103-04.
Robert Bork grounds his ideas of judicial ideology on the labels "conservatism" and
"liberalism":
[I]n each era the Court respond[s] to the ideology of the class to which the
Justicesfe[el] closest. By observing the values the Court chooses to enforce,
it is often possible to discern which classes have achieved dominance at any
given time in our history. 'Dominance,' as I use the word here, is not an
entirely clear concept. It refers to the tendency of a class's ideas and values
to be accepted by the elites that form opinion. In this century, we have
seen the Court allied to business interests and the ideology of free enter-
prise. We have seen that ideology lose its power with the arrival of the New
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sidering it as an aspect of fitness. 66 In Race-ing Justice, En-gendering
Power, ideology's significance directly relates to the African American
community: Is Thomas' conservatism an impediment to his fitness be-
cause his philosophy will perpetuate racial stigma and obstacles? Or is
it merely a symbol of maturity in the African American community
which will not preclude his ability to represent that community on the
bench?
This debate over Thomas' ideology echoes a division among legal
scholars of color-the critical race theorists and the black neo-con-
servatives. Although both camps lament the current social and eco-
nomic status of African Americans, they advocate different methods of
repair. Critical race theorists "urge mobilization, disruption, and sub-
versive storytelling to fuel change."6 7 Black conservatives such as Ste-
phen Carter advocate a form of "self help" which entails a "phaseout
of affirmative action" accompanied by the "creation of a cadre of
black professionals who, by being too good to ignore, refute all the
racist stereotypes."68
Although Swain and Morrison do not adopt the tenets of Black
conservatism, their argument that Thomas' views signify a maturity in
the Black community echoes Carter's sentiment that "[t] he dissenting
black intellectual, in short, can expect ostracism; and the predictable
effect of the ostracism is to discourage freedom of thought."6 9 Simi-
Deal and the effect of that ideological shift on the Supreme Court. The
intellectual class has become liberal, and that fact has heavily influenced
the Court's performance. For the past halft-century, whenever the Court
has departed from the original understanding of the Constitution's princi-
ples, it has invariably legislated an item on the modem liberal agenda,
never an item on the conservative agenda.
BoRK, supra note 6, at 130.
66 See supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text.
67 Richard Delgado, Enormous Anomaly? Left-Right Parallels in Recent Writings About
Race, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1547, 1556 (1991) (book review).
68 CARTER, supra note 49, at 94-95. Carter suggests that:
What is needed.., is the development of a better grammar of race, a way
through which we can at once take account of it and not punish it. And a
sensible way to start... is to say that with all the various instances in which
race might be relevant, either to the government or to individuals, it will
not be used as an indicator of merit-no one will be more valued than
anyone else because of skin color. The corollary is that everyone's merit
would therefore be judged by the same tests, and if the tests in question are
unfair... then they will be swept away and replaced with something elsa
Id. at 227-28.
69 CARTE, supra note 49, at 129. Carter laments that these dissenters are silenced and
not able to engage in a debate about the proper methods for aiding the Black community
without being "excoriated." Id. at 107. Carter also examines the psychological pain which
accompanies that ostracization:
Clarence Thomas put it this way. "I don't like being controversial and un-
popular among members of my race .... I hate it that other people of my
race think, 'Here's this black guy trashing everything that's supposed to be
good for us.'"
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larly, Marable's argument that Thomas' conservatism threatens Afri-
can American welfare resembles critical race scholar Kimberle
Crenshaw's sentiment that the black neo-conservative "self-help"
model exchanges explicit notions of racial bias for cultural "norms"
which perpetuate stereotypes about people of color.70
Traditional theorists may respond that these analyses of the Clar-
ence Thomas hearings add nothing new to the established debate
over the place of ideology in the determination of fitness. They may
argue that these fights over Thomas' ideology may properly be sub-
sumed into the political/non-political framework established in previ-
ous works. According to Tribe, Bork, Carter and their colleagues, the
important questions are whether the Framers intended to allow in-
quiries into ideology when they gave the President and the Senate
Article Two, Section Two powers; whether investigations into ideology
can diminish the separation of powers; and whether considering ide-
ology raises or lowers the quality of the individuals that we place on
the Court.71 Moreover, their conception of ideology is a race-free one
which looks to labels such as "conservatism" and "liberalism" for its
ultimate definition. These dominant theories, however, lack the
proper focal points to analyze race and gender in the judicial selec-
tion process with adequate specificity.
The essayists in Race-ingJustice, En-gendering Power shift this focus.
First, they eagerly ask questions about race and ideology. To Morri-
son, Marable and Swain, the issue is not whether investigation into
Thomas' ideology subverts original intent or threatens separation of
powers, but what it means to the African American community. These
essayists want to know if different ideologies in the African American
community equal maturity or self-destruction. They also ask questions
about racial representation that the dominant theories ignore. More-
over, these essayists supplement the simple notion of ideology that
classifies in terms of conservatism (anti-abortion, strict-construction-
ism) or liberalism (pro-defendant's rights, so-called 'Judicial activ-
ism"). The discussion of judicial philosophy in Race-ing Justice, En-
gendering Power does not just correspond to the conservative and lib-
eral labels, but examines whether ideology may have a direct relation-
ship with Black identity. These essayists delve into the difficult
Id. at 130-31 (citing Paul Weyrich, Clarence Thomas: Here Comes the Judge, WASH. TIMES, Mar.
1, 1990, at El).
70 Crenshaw, supra note 52, at 1379. Crenshaw argues that theses like Carter's and
Thomas' "appl[y] the same stereotypes to the mass of Blacks that white supremacists had
applied in the past, but bas [e] these modem stereotypes on notions of 'culture' rather than
genetics." Id.
For an examination of the similarities between critical race theory and black conserva-
tism, see Delgado, supra note 67.
71 See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text.
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question of whether there is a nexus between ethnicity and ideology,
or whether "blackness" is a construct apart from politics.
The questions posited by Marable, Morrison and Swain may seem
like just one of the many examples of the expressly political process of
public debate about the meaning of a nominee. And they are such
examples. They are also more than just a political debate over one
nominee. They are questions about how the Thomas appointment
reflects the changing identity of African Americans as a group.
3. Moral Character
Moral character and ethics are traditionally accepted factors to
consider in the determination of fitness for appointment of a
Supreme Court Justice. They have also destroyed some nomina-
tions.72 Moral and ethical character became a pivotal issue in the
Thomas hearings once Anita Hill accused Thomas of sexually harass-
ing her with stories about his sexual prowess and his consumption of
pornography.73 Although the Senate initially ignored Hill's allega-
tions, it eventually held the now-famous special hearings to determine
the truth of her allegations.
Toni Morrison argues that these hearings were not a truth seek-
ing mission to discover whether Thomas had the appropriate moral
character to serve on the Court. Rather, she finds that the charge of
harassment took on a different meaning in this nomination because
of Thomas' race. For Morrison, the fact that Thomas is an African
American is the main reason that the nomination was still viable after
the accusation and the subsequent hearings:
An accusation of such weight as sexual misconduct would prob-
ably have disqualified a white candidate on its face. Rather than any
need for "proof," the slightest possibility that it was publicly verifia-
ble would have nullified the candidacy, forced the committee mem-
bers to insist on another nominee rather than entertain the
necessity for public debate on so loathsome a charge. But in a
racialized and race-conscious society, standards are changed, facts
marginalized, repressed, and the willingness to air such charges, ac-
tually to debate them, outweighed the seemliness of a substantive
hearing because the actors were black.7 4
72 Consider, for example, Justice Fortas' nomination to Chief Justice which was cut
short in part because of evidence of his greed, revealed when reporters discovered that "he
had accepted a then-huge lecture fee ($15,000) to conduct a series of university seminars."
ABRAHAM, supra note 42, at 291. Consider also District of Columbia CircuitJudge Douglas
Ginsburg's nomination, which failed after reporters found that he had smoked marijuana
while a Harvard Law School professor and also had some conflict of interest problems. See
Aric Press, Pot and Politics, N.wswEEK, Nov. 16, 1987, at 46.
73 See Gloria Boger, The Untold Story, U.S. NEw & WoRru REP., Oct. 12, 1992, at 28.
74 Morrison, supra note 17, at xvii.
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According to Morrison, although the Committee stalled on their deci-
sion to consider Hill's charges, the Committee ultimately used the
charges levied against Thomas' moral character to objectify him and
to focus on Black people's bodies in a way that is de rigueur in white
discourse. 75 Morrison contends that "it seems blazingly clear that [this
was an] unprecedented opportunity to hover over and to cluck at, to
mediate and ponder the limits and excesses of black bodies [and so]
no other strategies were going to be entertained."76 Indeed, the addi-
tional hearings were spectacles, with references to Thomas' comments
about his penis size, his pubic hair, and his descriptions of porno-
graphic movies. 77
Morrison reads the Senate Judiciary Committee's treatment of
the moral character issue as racial politics-a way of objectifying Black
people and exemplifying racial subordination by focusing on Black
sexuality and physicality. This understanding marks a departure from
traditional theories about the judicial selection process. Paul Freund,
for example, finds that "focus on the nominee's character remains
paramount"78 and Stephen Carter advocates trying "to get a sense of
the whole person, an impression partaking not only of the nominee's
public legal arguments, but of her entire moral universe."79 Morrison
expands on the previous theories by showing how morality, privacy
and race can mix together in ways not anticipated by Freund and
Carter's flat assertions of the propriety of moral character investiga-
tion. She first illustrates how the "moral character" investigation
delved into the private realm of sexuality, and then she shows how the
Committee felt comfortable doing this because of Thomas' race, and
thus used the inquiry as a vehicle for racial subordination-the "cluck-
ing" over Black bodies. 80
75 Id. at xvii.
76 Id. at xiv, xvii.
77 Adam Clymer, Parade of Witnesses Support Hill's Story, Thomas's Integrity, N.Y. TIMEs,
Oct. 14, 1991, at AI: "Professor Hill ... said judge Thomas had spoken to her of pornogra-
phy, specific sexual acts and the size of his penis."
78 Freund, supra note 54, at 1146.
79 Carter, supra note 5, at 1198.
80 Morrison, supra note 17, at xii-xix. Morrison's discussion of the moral character
issue in Thomas's hearings resembles Professor Derrick Bell's analysis of the" 'ideological
hegemony' of white racism" which provides a " 'public rationale to justify, explain, legiti-
mize, or tolerate racism.' " It is "sustained by a culturally ingrained response by whites to
any situation in which whites aren't in a clearly dominant role." DERRICK BELL, AND WE
ARE NOT SAVED 156 (1987) (quoting Manning Marable, Beyond the Race Dilemma, NATION,
Apr. 11 (1981), at 428, 431). Morrison's argument that the hearings on sexual harassment
were motivated by a desire to objectify black bodies, that "no other strategies were going to
be entertained," may be seen as an example of Bell and Marable's arguments that whites
respond in a race-conscious and racist way when they are not clearly in control. Here, the
all-white SenateJudiciary Committee may have reacted to Thomas in the way that Morrison
argues contributes to racial subordination because the Committee was considering allocat-
ing a great deal of power (and, perhaps, some of their control) to a Black man.
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Morrison's discussion of the Committee's disturbing focus on
Black illicit sexuality also calls upon another question: how the pro-
ceedings implicated Black identity. Negative images of African Ameri-
cans existed outside of the moral character investigation and
problematic issues about the intersection of race and gender also sur-
faced. Thus, the Thomas hearings reflected racial and gender biases.
C. The Hearings and Black Identity
Be thou a spirit of health or goblin damned,
Bring with thee airs from heaven or blasts from hell,
Be thy intents wicked or charitable,
Thou com'st in such a questionable shape
That I will speak to thee .... Let me
not burst in ignorance, but .... Say,
why is this? Wherefore? What should we do?
-Shakespeare, Hamlet, Prince of Denmark,
Act I, scene iv81
The essayists in Race-ingJustice, En-gendering Power delineate how
familiar patterns of racial stereotyping and race and gender subordi-
nation were re-played in the selection process. The candidate himself,
President Bush, Senators and the press used racial stereotypes to de-
pict Thomas. Stereotypical assumptions about Black women also sur-
faced after Anita Hill publicly accused Thomas of sexual harassment;
moreover, disturbing examples of Black women's lack of power were
evident in the way that the hearings were conducted and structured.
1. The Process, Thomas and Stereotypes About Black Men
Both the nomination and the confirmation processes evoked ste-
reotypes about Black men and their sexuality. Stereotypes about
Black male sexuality appeared often in President Bush's, the Senate's
and the press' explicit references to Thomas' body parts. Thomas ob-
served this reliance on Black male sexual stereotyping and manipu-
lated it to his own advantage. These stereotypes and the reactions to
them are disturbing and sometimes confusing: after all, some of the
worst incidents of stereotyping came from Thomas' supporters, and
Thomas' curious evocation of stereotypes may have clinched his ap-
pointment. Most important, however, is what the evocation of these
stereotypes reveals about the appointment process and its concomi-
tant theories. It also demonstrates how Thomas' introduction into the
process dismissed illusions of its purported neutrality.
81 Tui CoMP=ETE SIGNET CLAssIc SHAKEsPEARE 925 (Sylvan Barnet ed., 1972).
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a. Parsing
Various stories about Thomas, minute characterizations that
served to parse him into racially-tinged parts that informed the whole,
were evident in the President's and some senators' comments. The
press latched onto these stories and conveyed them with zeal. There
was, for example, an unprecedented focus on his the nominee's body
and bodily functions. Morrison notes that the media placed a "curi-
ous spotlight on his body"8 2 by focusing on his "weight lifting",8 3 and
by reducing Thomas to his physical elements. Senator Pete Domenici
remarked, for example, that he "wanted to find out.., as best I could
what his life-from outhouse to the White House... has been like."84
Morrison also discusses how Bush made the final offer to Thomas in
Bush's bedroom and that Thomas himself commented that he did not
like to play golf because "[t]he ball's too small."8 5 These references
diverted attention away from Thomas' mind, and they also served to
sexualize him-to translate his body parts into the bathroom or the
bedroom. 86 This form of stereotyping (the Black man as "body")
could only make him more understandable and familiar.
Another troubling example of the Senate's interest in Thomas'
physical characteristics is found in Senator Danforth's introduction of
Thomas by referring to the laugh:
I concede that there is something weird about Clarence Thomas.
It's his laugh. It is the loudest laugh I have ever heard. It comes
from deep inside, and it shakes his body. And here is something at
least as weird in this most up-tight of cities: the object of his laugh-
ter is most often himself.8 7
Morrison writes that the discussion of the laugh did not merely repre-
sent Thomas' good nature, but rather was a "gesture of accommoda-
tion and obedience needed to open discussion with a Black person
and certainly to continue it."88 Morrison challenges the genial, laugh-
ing character created and coddled by Thomas and his backers with
her own version: The laugh signified a malleability and obsequi-
ousness which is unexpected in Supreme Court Justices, but which
eased Thomas into acceptance and accessibility.8 9
82 Morrison, supra note 17, at xiii.
83 Id.
84 Id. at xiv.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id. at xii-xiii.
88 Id. at xiii.
89 Id.
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b. The "high-tech lynching"
In his defense against Hill's charges, Thomas himself made a dis-
turbing use of racial stereotypes which drew on the painful history of
African Americans:
[This is] a high-tech lynching for uppity blacks who in any way deign
to think for themselves, to do for themselves, to have different
ideas, and it is a message that unless you kowtow to an old order,
this is what will happen to you. You will be lynched, destroyed, cari-
catured by a committee of the U.S. Senate rather than hung from a
tree.90
Thomas attempted to transform the sexual harassment charge into an
indictment of his conservative ideology, his self-help thesis to "do for"
himself; he then defended against this charge with the counter accusa-
tion of a "high-tech lynching." Yet the sexual content of the charge
and the corresponding defense was still available: the lynching of
Blacks is historically linked to suspicions of Blacks overstepping their
social and sexual boundaries.
By appealing to this history, Thomas transformed himself from
Morrison's laughing man into what Nellie Y. McKay describes in her
essay Remembering Anita Hill and Clarence Thomas: What Really Happened
When One Black Woman Spoke Out.9' "He, with a great display of arro-
gance ... thundered and roared his denials, daring the white men
chosen to decide on his fitness for the Court to deny him access to
that seat."92 Thomas' successful act of self-preservation was, as
Kimberl6 Crenshaw writes in Whose Story Is It, Anyway? Feminist and An-
tiracist Appropriations of Anita Hil493 to "drape himself in a history of
black male repression"94 by naming himself the victim of a high-tech
lynching. Thomas transmogrified himself into an angry Black man by
identifying himself as the victim and by accusing Hill of siding with
the enemy-a White lynch mob. McKay finds that "Thomas' evoca-
tion of the single most emotional issue at the heart of the black and
white community's relationship further inscribed his determined use
of racial-sexual politics to gain his ends."95 Thomas' lynching meta-
phor disarmed the African American community. Many rallied to his
side after he spoke in his own defense-and his approval ratings in
the Black community rose from fifty-four percent to nearly eighty per-
90 Thomas, supra note 29, at 366.
91 Nellie Y. McKay, Remembering Anita Hill and Clarence Thomas: What Really Happened
When One Black Woman Spoke Ou4 in RACE-INGJusTicE, EN-GENDERING POWER, supra note 2,
at 269.
92 Id. at 271.
93 KimberlE Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It Anyway? Feminist and Antitrust Appropriations of
Anita Hil, in RACE-ING JUsTICE, EN-GENDERIN POWER, supra note 2, at 402.
94 Id. at 416.
95 McKay, supra note 91, at 284.
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cent.96 His reference to lynching succeeded in part because his ap-
peals to racial victimization tapped into a profound source of
suffering. It was true: Black men had been lynched for misguided
perceptions of their sexuality. The Senators recognized the power of
the reference, and "could not muster the moral authority to challenge
Thomas' sensationalist characterization." 97 In the hubbub and histri-
onics, however, an important fact was forgotten. Thomas was telling
the wrong story. Black men had been lynched for allegedly raping
White women.98
c. Stereotypes in the process and theory of judicial selection
This analysis of the racial politics in judicial selection enables us
to understand the Thomas event in ways that previous theories could
not. Post-Thomas theories about judicial selection must be broader
than the one espoused by Professor Monaghan, who argues that "[ t] he
entire appointment process is best understood as largely beyond the
operation of norms of legal right or wrong; instead it involves mainly
questions of prudence, judgment, and politics."99 New theories must
incorporate an awareness of how racial stereotyping can permeate the
process, shape the characterization of nominees, and affect the reac-
tions that nominees elicit.
Monaghan might respond that the racial politics so evident in the
Thomas proceedings were merely products of the already political se-
lection process which his theory identifies. Yet the analysis of how
race figured in the process in sometimes subtle ways-in a comment
or a description-adds a new dimension to our understanding of what
the "political" is. The meaning of "political" in the judicial selection
process, where the nominee is a woman or person of color, must also
encompass how race and gender politics insinuate themselves into the
process to accomplish various ends. An analysis of judicial selection
should also critique how racial stereotypes can be used and re-used to
belittle African Americans (by White senators) or be manipulated to
defend against allegations of illegal or unethical conduct (by the nom-
inee). Monaghan's theory and others like it fail to examine with any
detail the various roles that race and gender play, beyond some ge-
neric, race-neutral concept of politics.
96 Crenshaw, supra note 93, at 417.
97 Id. at 416.
98 Nellie McKay writes that "Besides, no man, white or black, has ever faced death for
the sexual abuse of a black woman." McKay, supra note 91, at 285. Kimberl6 Crenshaw
writes the "allegations relating to the sexual abuse of black women have had nothing to do
with the history of lynching, a tradition based upon white hysteria regarding black male
access to white women." Crenshaw, supra note 93, at 416.
99 Monaghan, supra note 7, at 1207.
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2. The Hearings, Race, and Gender
Troubling issues concerning gender and its intersection with race
emerged in the Hearings. The Committee used questionable meth-
ods to de-legitimize Anita Hill's character and, in the process, enter-
tained images about her which were more a product of stereotype
than truth. Additionally, the procedural aspects of the hearings
evoked questions about power imbalances along racial and gender
lines.
a. Stories
Certain members of the Senate fostered two images of Anita Hill
to impugn her character. One line of questioning in the hearings
elicited answers that depicted her as a fantasizer who craved male ado-
ration and who wrongly imagined that they reciprocated her atten-
tions. Senator DeConcini, for example, asked John Doggett, a lawyer
who had known Hill in 1982, whether she would "somewhat fantasize
as to a relationship that she thought she was going to have with
you."'100 Doggett, on the basis of his "male intuition," depicted Hill as
a spurned woman, who had made "bizarre" and "intense" comments
to him about their non-existent relationship and tried to "hit" on
him. 101 Doggett asserted that Hill's allegations against Thomas were
also fantasies, the product of her deluded mind: "I believe ... that
there is absolutely no truth to what she has said. But I believe that she
believes it. I was impressed with her confidence, her calm, even
though the things she was saying in my mind, were absolutely, totally
beyond the pale of reality."'1 2 Senator Specter asked Charles A.
Kothe, the founding dean of Oral Roberts University, to read lan-
guage from his affidavit which said "I'm convinced that [the allega-
tions are] a product of fantasy," even though Kothe later called his
"selection of words... unfortunate."10 3 Other senators depicted Hill
as a deliberate liar, 04 who had lifted stories about Thomas' consump-
tion of pornography from a 1988 Tenth Circuit case' 05 and his alleged
comments to her from The Exorcist.'0 6
100 Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 437
(1991).
101 Id. at 554-57.
102 Id. at 573.
103 Id. at 553.
104 See Hendrik Hertzberg, Leaks, Lies, and the Law: What Became of the GOP's Anita Hill
Conspiracy Theory?, THE WASH. Posr, Dec. 1, 1991, at C1, C4 ("Arlen Specter... accused
Hill... of 'flat-out perjury.' ").
105 Id.
106 Id. See CLARENCE THOMAS: CONFRONTING THE FUTURE 73 (1992) [hereinafter CON-
FRONTING THE FuTuRE].
1994] 395
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
It is difficult to imagine that the Senators would have treated Hill
in the same way if she were White. All women have a sad history of
sexual abuse, but the complaints of White women are more likely to
be believed or, at least, cared about. 0 7 The Senators' treatment of
Hill corresponds to Black women's traditional experience. Patricia
Williams confronts the stories about Hill with her own.108 She writes
from the perspective that these depictions of Hill were true-yet to
call the hearings truth could only transform Hill into what she was
painted to be:
Thus it is that Anita Hill is dispositively a witch. Everything she
touched inverted itself. She was relentlessly ambitious yet "clini-
cally" reserved, consciously lying while fantasizing truth. Lie detec-
tors broke down and the ashes of 'impossible truth' spewed forth
from her mouth. She was controlled yet irrational, naive yet know-
ing, prim but vengeful, a cool, hotheaded, rational hysteric. 10 9
This narrative performs what Professor Richard Delgado would
deem an "important destructive function,"" 0 by taking the position
that these stories were true and were correctly situated in the realm of
neutrality. If that is so, then Hill, a black female law professor, can be
only part human, the rest being "of the potent black witchcraft breed,
with tar and owl feathers and howling winds.""' The witch metaphor
encompasses all of the stories that the hearing participants told about
Hill. It shows how the tales were symptoms of the race and gender
clash between Hill and a process which uses the White male as its pri-
mary referent: Hill, a "mixture heretofore not recognized in the glos-
107 See Crenshaw, supra note 93, at 414. Crenshaw notes that:
Black women experience much of the sexual aggression that the feminist
movement has articulated but in a form that represents simultaneously
their subordinate racial status. While the fallen-women imagery that white
feminists identify does represent much of black women's experience of
gender domination, given their race, black women have in a sense always
been within the fallen-woman category.
Id.
See alsoJoan Didion, Sentimental Journeys, in BEST AMERICAN ESSAYs 1992, 1, 7-8 (Susan
Sontag ed., 1992) (discussing the different responses to the 1989 rape of the "Central Park
Jogger," a white professional woman, and the "3,254 other rapes [that] were reported that
year, including one the following week involving the near decapitation of a black woman in
Fort Tryon Park.").
108 PatriciaJ. Williams, A Rare Case Study of Muleheadedness and Men: Or How to Try an
Unruly Black Witch, With Excerpts From the Heretical Testimony of Four Women, Known to be Hyster-
ics, Speaking in Their Own Voices, as Translated for This Publication by Brothers Hatch, Simpson,
DeConcini, and Specter, in RACE-INGJus'TcE, EN-GENDERING POWER, supra note 2, at 159.
109 d. at 169.
110 This type of narrative shows "that what we believe is ridiculous, self-serving, or
cruel. They can show us the way out of the trap of unjustified exclusion. They can help us
understand when it is time to reallocate power. They are the other half-the destructive
half-of the creative dialectic." Delgado, supra note 32, at 2415.
111 Williams, supra note 108, at 165.
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sary of racial tropes," 2 did not come before the Committee as one
woman with allegations, but rather was an incomprehensible figure, a
"mermaid" or a "Loch Ness monster."113
b. Procedure
An analysis of the race and gender significance of the Thomas
proceedings must also address a procedural aspect of the hearings.
The essayists do not investigate this aspect with any great depth. The
hearings on sexual harassment were conducted like a criminal trial in
one important way: the allocation of the "burden of proof." Senator
Danforth told the Senate that:
the burden against the accuser [Anita Hill] must be very heavy in a
case such as this to discourage exactly the kind of process we have
seen particularly during the last 10 days . . . [I]f we vote against
Clarence Thomas we reward a process which is clearly wrong. And
for that reason, not for the sake of Clarence Thomas, but for the
sake of the basic American standard of decency and fairness, I ask
Senators to vote for the confirmation of Clarence Thomas.114
This allocation of the burden of proof in judicial selection is unprece-
dented." 5 Indeed, the importance of the Senate's decision would
seem to argue against such an allocation. Any Senator harboring
doubt about Thomas' conduct should have voted against the nomina-
tion. Nevertheless, it appears that Danforth's rhetoric persuaded his
colleagues to use something like a reasonable doubt standard when
determining Thomas' fitness in this area.116
This allocation of a very heavy burden of proof to Anita Hill was
not, despite Danforth's argument, a way to achieve decency and fair-
ness. Instead, it incorporated the biases against Black women into the
112 Morrison, supra note 17, at xvi.
113 Williams, supra note 108, at 165. See also Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986
Term-Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HAxv. L. REv. 10, 32, 68 (1987) ('The unstated
point of comparison is not neutral, but particular, and not inevitable, but only seemingly
so when left unstated .... Power is at its peak when it is least visible, when it shapes
preferences, arranges agendas, and excludes serious challenges from discussions or even
imagination"); PAmiciA Wiums, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 130 (1991) ("[T]he
perspective we need to acquire is one beyond those ... boxes that have been set up. It is a
perspective that exists on all... levels... simultaneously. It is this perspective, the ambiva-
lent, multivalent way of seeing, that is at the core of what is called critical theory, feminist
theory, and much of the minority critique of law."); Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism in
Feminist Legal Theory, in FEMINIST LEcAL THEORY 235, 255 (1991) ("In order to energize
legal theory, we need to subvert it with narratives and stories, accounts of the particular,
the different, and the hitherto silenced.").
114 See CoNFaoNTimr THE FUTURE, sura note 106, at 151.
115 See David Lauter, Crucial Votes Seem Headed Toward Thomas, L. TImEs, Oct. 15,
1991, at Al (discussing the "emerging standard" of a burden of proof).
116 Burnham, supra note 27, at 317-18 ("In these circumstances, where the burden of
proof had been placed on Anita Hill, a viewer whose mind was in equipoise would likely be
of the opinion that Thomas should be confirmed.").
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structure of the hearings. Conceptually, the allocation of a burden of
proof seems like a race and gender neutral apparatus; it is an integral
part of the legal system that exists without reference to individual
characteristics. Yet, it sharply demonstrates the fiction of neutrality:
this burden rigidified and legitimized the bias that already existed
against Hill."17 Although the Senators may have disbelieved Hill be-
cause of their own preconceptions about Black women's veracity and
sexuality, the burden that was placed upon her may have made their
disbelief appear the product of a neutral mechanism in an orderly
and fair process.
The Senate's treatment of Anita Hill seems less surprising consid-
ering that women of color face both race and gender discrimina-
tion."1s Nevertheless, to understand exactly how the Senators' sought-
after testimony reflected racist and sexist stereotypes and how the bur-
den of proof presented a microcosm of societal discrimination, it is
necessary to specify how race and gender affects the institution ofjudi-
cial selection. Only by explicitly examining the examples of stereotyp-
ing and bias that existed in the Thomas hearings can we identify the
race and gender-consciousness, clothed as neutrality, that danced
through the proceedings as evocatively and seemingly elusively as
Hamlet's ghost. Only by naming the configurations of race and gen-
der can the screen upon which Hill (and Thomas) were placed and
judged by the President, the Senate, and the nation be understood. It
is not the stage identified by previous theorists, one whose only identi-
117 See WiLuIAms, supra note 113, at 48 ("What was most interesting to me in this experi-
ence [the submission of a law review article] was how the blind application of principles of
neutrality... acted either to make me look crazy or to make the reader participate in the
old habits of cultural bias."). See also Bob Dart, Is Judge a Villain or a Victim?, THE ATLANTA
CONST., Oct. 15, 1991, at A7 ("Uncertainty is virtually guaranteed because the hearing was
not a trial in which Ms. Hill's charges against Judge Thomas had to be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. In this case, each senator sets his or her own standards for determining
the confirmation verdict.").
118 See Crenshaw, supra note 52, at 73 n.3. Crenshaw clarifies that:
The most common linguistic manifestation of [the tendency to treat race
and gender as mutually exclusive categories of experience and analysis] is
represented in the conventional usage of the term "Blacks and women."
Although it may be true that some people mean to include Black women in
either "Blacks" or "women," the context in which the term is used actually
suggests that often Black women are not considered. ... It seems that if
Black women were explicitly included, the preferred term would be either
"Blacks and white women."
Id.
See also McKay, supra note 91, at 277-78. McKay observed that:
For in all of their lives in America, whatever the issue, black women have
felt torn between the loyalties that bind them to race on one hand, and sex
on the other. Choosing one or the other, of course, means taking sides
against the self, yet they have almost always chosen race over the other. a
sacrifice of their self-hood as women and of full humanity, in favor of the
race.
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fiable players were a vague idea of "politics," robed in costumes of
conservatism or liberalism and intellectual "competence." The sub-
stance and the procedure of the hearings, instead, were shaped by
gender and race.
III
TowARD REPARATION
S.. there is
No common vantage point, no point of view
Like the "I" in a novel. And in truth
No one never saw the point of any. This stubble-field
Of witnessings and silent lowering of the lids
On angry screen-door moment rushing back
To the edge of woods was always alive with its own
Rigid binary system of inducing truths
From starved knowledge of them.
-John Ashbery 19
The essayists in Race-ingJustice, En-gendering Power fight against the
constraints of language and bias to name what had only flitted before
the viewers of the Thomas hearings as shadows of meaning. Digging
deep through the words and the different layers of meaning, they
help construct a vision of the changing appointment process, one
which "women and minorities" are infiltrating slowly. The biased na-
ture of the process is evident in the way individuals used race and
gender to obfuscate, to compartmentalize and to manipulate. What
surfaces is the understanding that the Thomas appointment process
was diseased, so infected with racism and sexism that it could not op-
erate without those referents. The Committee, which is politically ac-
countable to the voters, 120 seeks to avoid a repeat performance and is
currently trying to develop ways to remedy the process. The Commit-
tee would be wise to read Race-ing Justice, En-gendering Power before
making any final decisions.
The problems with the judicial selection process detailed here
have no easy solutions. The racism, sexism and stereotyping in the
Thomas incident are products of the seemingly intractable problems
of prejudice imbedded in the strata of our history and evident in al-
most every aspect of our society. Perhaps we cannot correct the judi-
119 John Ashbery, No Way of Knowing, in SELF-PoRTRAIT IN A CONVEX MIRROR 56 (1975).
120 See, e.g., Arlen Specter's Rude Awakening, WASH. Posr, Oct. 18, 1991, at DI ("[Specter]
has been castigated by women's groups, called Public Enemy No. 2 by feminist Betty
Friedan ... and become the object of fury from women all over the country for his surgical
questioning of Professor Anita Hill during the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings on
Judge Clarence Thomas"); The Thomas Confirmation, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 18, 1991, at A10; Spec-
ter Voices Disappointment with Clarence Thomas, REuTERs, Sept. 9, 1991, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, REUTERS File.
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cial selection process until we alter the existing macro-patterns of
gender and race subordination. Race-ingJustice, En-gendering Powers
ability to leave the reader with these hard questions about judicial se-
lection, however, may demonstrate that real change in the process is
possible if we just know where to start looking for answers. Armed
with this realization, I offer the following suggestions as starting points
in what can hopefully be a long and fruitful search for reparation.
The strength of Race-ingJustice, En-gendering Power lies not in uni-
formity of opinion, but in its robust exchange of ideas. It is a dialogue
examining the race and gender issues apparent in the Thomas hear-
ing. The Committee should try to produce a similar dialogue in its
proceedings when developing a new process. At the most general
level, reparations should begin with a critique of neutrality, a compre-
hension that choices about what questions senators ask and about the
structure of the hearings may have significant race and gender mean-
ing, especially where women and people of color are involved in the
process.' 21 For example, the Committee should re-think its amenabil-
ity to holding the more controversial hearings in closed sessions.' 22
Although closed sessions would give the hearings a patina of neutral-
ity, they are a decidedly non-neutral practice. Because the public
would be ignorant of the Committee's investigation of the most diffi-
cult issues, charges like sexual harassment could be taken less seri-
ously. Likewise, the members of the Committee would be immune
from public response to whatever exhibitions of race and gender bias
occurred behind closed doors. Senate Judiciary Committee hearings
121 See Minow, supra note 113, at 70. ("There is no neutrality, no escape from choice.
But it is possible to develop better abilities to name and grasp competing perspectives, and
to make more knowing choices thereafter.").
122 See Nightline. A Town Meeting. A Process Run Amok-Can It Be Fixed? (ABC television
broadcast, Oct. 16, 1991), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, SCRIPT File:
Sen. Specter: ... I think there's a start the committee could do, and
that is to have executive sessions. I was interested in that -
Koppel: By which you mean closed sessions?
Sen. Specter: Yes, I mean closed sessions .... [W]e should have it and
we should have that with very limited staff and very limited handlers with
regard to the nominee and have half a day or a day or two days. The Intelli-
gence Committee does this and the Ethics Committee does this and I think
it would be well for the Judiciary Committee to do this. That would be a
start.
Koppel: Senator Simon?
Sen. Simon: ... I agree with Alan in terms of a charge like sexual
harassment. That kind of a charge I think we should have in closed session.
See also Neil A. Lewis, High Court Nominee Faces Easy Road Through Senate, N.Y. Tndsas, July 20,
1993, at A15 ("Beginning with [Ruth Bader Ginsburg's] ... nomination, the Committee
will hold a closed hearing for all future nominees to consider any allegations about per-
sonal conduct.").
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have been open to the public since 1929123 and have contributed to
the fairness of those proceedings. 124
More specifically, the Committee should strive for a multiplicity
of perspective. Although admittedly a vague phrase which appears
more consistent with theory than practice, it nevertheless can be
meaningfully applied in the hearings process. The first and most obvi-
ous development that needs to be made is a more diverse Senate Judi-
ciary Committee. 125 Second, the Committee must become more self-
conscious in its proceedings, in order to transcend culturally in-
grained modes of thought.' 26 The Committee should ask itself why
hearings are conducted in the way that they are. Are members asking
certain questions of nominees because of assumptions about a nomi-
nee or a witness based on his or her race or gender? Does the struc-
ture of the hearings rigidify those biases? In the Thomas hearings, the
senators should have asked why certain members of the Committee
tried to lambaste Hill's character instead of merely allowing her to
give her testimony and deciding individually what weight to give it in
their analysis. Was it really necessary to depict her as a liar? Was it
necessary to depict her as a demented and jealous woman?127 Why
did they introduce a heavy burden of proof? Did their modes of ques-
123 See Freund, supra note 54, at 1157. Radio microphones and television cameras were
not permitted in the hearings untilJustice Sandra Day O'Connor's 1981 nomination. Nina
Totenberg, The Confirmation Process and the Public: To Know or Not to Know, 101 HARv. L.
Ray. 1213 (1988).
124 Consider, for example, the nomination of Louis Brandeis. Before the Brandeis
hearings, Attorney General Thomas W. Gregory knew that Brandeis would be accused of
unprofessional conduct, but that these charges were motivated by a bias against Jews.
Gregory moved to have the hearings opened to the public, which was an "unusual proce-
dure at the time." JOSEPH P. HARRms, THE ADvica AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE 103 (1953).
Harris wrote that open hearings were:
essential to the approval of the nominee. If the hearings had been closed it
would have been impossible to clear Brandeis of these charges; with open
hearings, the opposing witnesses were more cautious in their statements.
The hearings brought to public attention the fact that there was not suffi-
cient factual evidence to substantiate the various accusations, or the accusa-
tions were controverted by reliable witnesses. When exposed to a searching
inquiry, most of the charges and rumors of unprofessional conduct were
revealed to be little more than prejudiced opinion."
Id.
125 With Senators Diane Feinstein and Carol Moseley-Braun on the panel, the Commit-
tee is more diverse than it was during the Clarence Thomas hearings.
126 See Kim A. Taylor, Invisible Woman: Reflections on the Clarence Thomas Confirmation
Hearing, 45 STAN. L. Rav. 443, 44849 (1993). ("[T]he men entrusted with the task of evalu-
ating the evidence presented during the hearings were limited and, ultimately, blinded by
their positions of privilege.... The senators failed to appreciate the significance of Profes-
sor Hill's experience as a woman in the workplace, and they were completely ignorant of
her life struggles as an African American. The real Anita Faye Hill remained invisible to
them.").
127 See id.. at 445. ("[T]he Committee had an infinite variety of models from which to
choose. It could have established a nonconfrontational setting, gathering facts through
the presentation of statements and clarifying issues with open-ended questions.").
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tioning or the burden have any "cultural meaning,"128 that is, did they
fit into patterns of race and gender discrimination that women and
people of color face?129 In these instances, the Committee should
consider calling "expert" witnesses to educate its members on the sub-
tleties of discrimination and on how individuals may respond to vari-
ous forms of discrimination such as sexual and racial harassment.
This could help defuse the power of certain misconceptions such as
the belief that failure to report harassment signifies that the victim
enjoyed it or that it never happened. Additionally, such an education
would sensitize Committee members to guard against the emergence
of bias in the hearings without undermining the ability of the process
to accurately determine judicial fitness.
These suggestions are open to criticism. First, whenever we give
special attention to the "differences" of women and people of color-
in this context, the discrimination that they face and their response to
it-we run the risk of validating biases against them.130 Asking Com-
mittee members to be "sensitive" when questioning women and mi-
norities may create the perception that these individuals and their
qualifications can only be seen in light of a victim status, and thus,
limit our expectations of them.' 3 ' Yet, because the dangers of not
examining the race and gender meaning of Committee hearings are
so great, more gender and race consciousness is necessary to develop
a more conscientious process. The goal must be to incorporate wo-
men and people of color into that process so that they can fully par-
128 See Charles Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Uncon-
scious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 323 (1987).
129 This resembles Martha Minow's suggestion that the judiciary "engenderjustice" by
making a "perpetual commitment to approach questions of difference by seeking out un-
stated assumptions, about difference and typically unheard points of view. There will not
be a rule, a concept, a norm, or a test to apply .... I urge struggles over descriptions of
reality." See Minow, supra note 113, at 16.
130 See DEBORAH L. RHODE,JUSTICE AND GENDER 82 (1989). ("By constantly presenting
gender issues in difference-oriented frameworks, conventional legal discourse implicitly
biases analysis. To pronounce women either the same or different allows men to remain
the standard of analysis."). Minow cautions that:
[W]e may recreate difference either by noticing it or by ignoring it. Deci-
sions about employment, benefits, and treatment in society should not turn
on an individual's race, gender, religion, or membership in any other
group about which some have deprecating or hostile attitudes.... Focus-
ing on difference poses the risk of recreating them. Especially when used
by decisionmakers who award benefits and distribute burdens, traits of dif-
ference can carry meaning uncontrolled and unwelcomed by those to
whom they are assigned.
Minow, supra note 113, at 12.
131 Fear of this development was seen in one WALL STREErJouRNAL editorial written
after the Thomas hearings: "As the year draws to a close, what lessons are to be learned
from this? Women must not define themselves as victims. Victims can never be successful,
never be equal." R. Gaull Silberman, The Canonization of Anita Hill WALL ST. J., Oct. 20,
1992, at A22.
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ticipate in important decisionmaking, without using "sensitivity" to
race and gender issues as a vehicle to further demean them.132
One may also criticize these suggestions as futile gestures that
cannot achieve race and gender equity in the judicial selection pro-
cess because they focus on slippery notions of "neutrality" and "multi-
plicity of perspectives" instead of directly attacking societal
discrimination which has many roots and may be insoluble. No mat-
ter how self-conscious the Committee becomes in its method it might
only replace one form of racist or sexist response with another, unable
to overcome culturally ingrained biases. We may, however, already be
seeing the fruitfulness of introducing race and gender consciousness
into the political forum.133 Senator Carol Moseley-Braun, a new mem-
ber of the Senate Judiciary Committee, recently led the Senate in de-
nying the patent on the Confederate flag by reacting to the flag's
association with slavery and continuing racism.'34 Moreover, Braun
also provided a voice for women and racial minorities at the recent
confirmation hearings of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.
Finally, the judicial selection process should progress because of
its importance to the American people. As the national response to
the Thomas appointment shows, judicial selection can have a cataclys-
mic effect. The nation feels an almost "proprietary interest,"' 3 5 in
who is chosen to be on the Supreme Court and how they are chosen.
Although implementing procedures to ensure that race and gender
issues are recognized in the judicial selection process may be difficult,
it is crucial to do so. The Committee's focus on these matters will not
only provide a fairer process, but may also raise citizen's awareness of
how race and gender factor into our everyday lives.
132 See Minow, supra note 113, at 12. ("[R]efusing to acknowledge... differences may
make them continue to matter in a world constructed with some groups, but not others, in
mind.").
133 Gloria Steinem asserted that since the Thomas hearings " 'Sexual harassment com-
plaints are up 500 percent. .. .' Five months after the hearings, the Chicago Tribune
carried this main headline on the front page: Sex Harassment Complaints on Rise ....
Senator Barbara Mikulski of Maryland called the hearings a national 'teach in' on sexual
harassment." PAUL SImoN, ADVICE AND CONSENT 123 (1992). See Deborah L. Rhode, Sexual
Harassment 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1459 (1992); The Honorable Stephen Reinhardt, The End of
the Age ofIgnorance, 65 S. CAL. L REv. 1431 (1992).
134 Susan Feeney, Women, Minorities Altering Congress, DALLAS MORNING NEWs, August 5,
1993, at A37.
135 See Carter, supra note 5, at 1191.
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